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ABSTRACT
In this paper we introduce Second-order Propositional An-
nouncement Logic (SOPAL): a language to express arbitrary
announcements in Public Announcement Logic, by means
of propositional quantification. We present SOPAL within
a multi-agent context, and show that it is rich enough to
express complex notions such as preservation under arbi-
trary announcements, knowability, and successfulness. We
analyse the model theory of SOPAL and prove that it is
strictly more expressive than Arbitrary PAL [2], and as ex-
pressive as Second-order Propositional Epistemic Logic [4],
even though exponentially more succinct than the latter.
These results points to a rich logic, with nice computational
properties nonetheless, such as a decidable model checking
problem and a complete axiomatisation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge reasoning and representation has gained pre-
eminence in recent years and now it is rightly considered
as a success story in the applications of formal methods
to artificial intelligence [25]. In this broad line of research,
a distinct tradition is represented by epistemic modal lan-
guages, which extend propositional logic with operators Ka
to express the knowledge of an agent a. The investigations
begun in the seminal works by von Wright and Hintikka [26,
14], have now grown into a mature body of contributions
[17, 9]. Within this research direction an increasing interest
is directed towards the dynamics of knowledge: how is in-
dividual knowledge affected by factual change, information
exchange, or knowledge updates?
These questions have given rise to temporal epistemic log-
ics [9] and dynamic epistemic logics [23], among others. A
particular form of dynamics appearing in epistemic logic
deals with truthful public announcements, i.e., publicly ob-
servable information that is assumed to be reliable. These
occur in many multi-agent scenarios: card games, the muddy
children puzzle, security protocols [21]. Public announce-
ments are executed as model restrictions on the epistemic
state of the agents listening to them. This idea has been
formalised into Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [18, 13],
which extends epistemic logic with formulas of type [φ]ψ, to
express that after announcing φ publicly, ψ holds.
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Once public announcements are introduced, it is legiti-
mate to wonder what remains true after arbitrary announce-
ments (a property known as preservation), or what can be
known by agents provided some suitable public announce-
ment (knowability). In this paper we extend the framework
of PAL to deal exactly with this sort of issues. We introduce
Second-order Propositional Announcement Logic (SOPAL),
which extends PAL with propositional quantification. As a
result, the knowability of formula φ (by an agent a) becomes
intuitively expressible in SOPAL as
φ→ ∃p〈p〉Kaφ (1)
that is, if φ is true, then after some truthful announcement
p, agent a knows that φ is true.
The main contributions of the paper can be summarized
as follows. We first introduce the syntax and semantics of
SOPAL. Then, we compare SOPAL with Arbitrary Public
Announcement Logic (APAL) [2, 3], an extension of PAL
also including arbitrary announcements, and show in which
sense SOPAL is strictly more expressive than APAL. We fur-
ther provide reduction equivalences to eliminate announce-
ments from SOPAL, and thus show that SOPAL is as expres-
sive as Second-order Propositional Epistemic Logic (SOPEL),
an extension of epistemic logic with propositional quantifica-
tion [4]. This result allows us to transfer both the complete
axiomatisation and the decidable model checking problem
for SOPEL to SOPAL. Moreover, we prove that, even if they
are equally expressive, SOPAL is exponentially more suc-
cinct than SOPEL. Finally, we apply SOPAL to multi-agent
game scenarios and specify the dynamic epistemic notions
of knowable, preserved, and successful formula.
As a result, we have a powerful logic, with nice compu-
tational properties, such as a complete axiomatisation, a
decidable model checking problem, and a wide range of in-
teresting applications.
Scheme of the Paper. In Section 2 we introduce the
formal framework of Second-order Propositional Announce-
ment Logic. In Section 3 we prove that, at the level of
validities, SOPAL is strictly more expressive than APAL.
On the other hand, in Section 4 SOPAL is shown to be as
expressive as SOPEL. Nonetheless, the former is proved to
be exponentially more succinct than the latter in Section 5.
We point to future directions of research in the conclusions.
2. THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we introduce the syntax and semantics of
Second-order Propositional Announcement Logic (SOPAL).
2.1 Syntax
In the rest of the paper we assume a set AP of atomic
propositions (or atoms) and a finite set Ag of indexes for
agents. Formulas in SOPAL are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (SOPAL). The formulas in SOPAL are
defined in BNF as follows, for p ∈ AP and a ∈ Ag:
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ | ψ → ψ | Kaψ | [ψ]ψ | ∀pψ
The language Lsopal of SOPAL contains epistemic for-
mulas Kaφ, for each agent a ∈ Ag, which intuitively say
that “agent a knows φ”; announcement formulas [ψ]φ, whose
reading is that “after announcing ψ, φ is true”; as well as
quantified formula ∀pφ, which means that “for all proposi-
tions p, φ is true”. Symbols ⊥, >, connectives ∧, ∨, opera-
tors Ma, 〈ψ〉, and quantifier ∃ are defined as standard.
Second-order Propositional Announcement Logic extends
a number of well-known formalisms. The language Lpal of
Public Announcement Logic is obtained by removing con-
struct ∀pψ in Def. 1; language Lel without clause [ψ]ψ as
well is Epistemic Logic, and language Lpl without clause
Kaψ as well is propositional logic. Also, language Lsopel
obtained by removing clause [ψ]ψ in Def. 1 is Second-Order
Propositional Epistemic Logic [4]; while language Lsopl for
Second-order Propositional Logic is obtained from Lsopel by
removing clause Kaψ as well.
In the following we consider for comparison also the lan-
guage of Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic [2, 3], ob-
tained by extending PAL with formulas 2ψ:
ψ ::= p | ¬ψ | ψ → ψ | Kaψ | [ψ]ψ | 2ψ
where 2ψ is read as “after every truthful announcement,
φ holds”. Hereafter we show that SOPAL is rich enough
to express APAL through quantification. We summarize
the main (syntactic) language inclusions in the following
schema.
Lpl ⊆
⊆
Lsopl
Lel
⊆
⊆
⊆
Lsopel
Lpal
⊆
⊆
⊆
Lsopal
Lapal
Example 1. To illustrate the expressive power of SOPAL,
we briefly discuss various epistemic notions. In Public An-
nouncement Logic a formula φ is said to be preserved if φ
is true after any announcement. In SOPAL we can capture
this by requiring that the following formula holds:
φ→ ∀q[q]φ (2)
We informally remark that (2) does not hold for Moore’s
formula p∧¬Kap. However, in SOPAL we can define a suit-
able restriction of (2), concerning epistemic announcements
only:
φ→ ∀p[Kap]φ (3)
In Example 2 we show that (3), differently from (2), does
hold for Moore’s formulas.
Another notion of interest in PAL is knowability: a for-
mula φ is knowable (by agent a) iff after some announcement,
a knows φ [22]. We remarked that this notion can be stated
formally as (1). Clearly, Moore’s formulas are not knowable.
We will discuss and compare preserved, knowable, and other
classes of formulas in more detail in Section 4.1. 
In the rest of the section we introduce the technical no-
tions of free atom and substitution that are necessary through-
out the rest of the paper.
Definition 2 (Free Atoms). The set fr(φ) of free atoms
in a SOPAL formula φ is recursively defined as follows:
fr(p) = {p}
fr(¬φ) = fr(Kaφ) = fr(φ)
fr(φ→ φ′) = fr([φ]φ′) = fr(φ) ∪ fr(φ′)
fr(∀pφ) = fr(φ) \ {p}
The set bnd(φ) of bound atoms in φ is standardly intro-
duced as the set of all atoms q appearing in the scope of
some quantifier Qq. By renaming bound atoms, we can as-
sume w.l.o.g. that for every formula φ, sets fr(φ) and bnd(φ)
are disjoint. We now define when an atom p can be safely
substituted by a formula ψ in φ.
Definition 3 (Free for . . . ). A formula ψ is free for
atom p in φ iff p does not appear in φ within the scope of
any quantifier Qq, whenever q is free in ψ, and if φ = [φ′]φ′′
and p ∈ fr(φ′), then ψ ∈ Lsopl. Alternatively, we can define
whether ψ is free for p in φ as follows:
if φ is atomic then ψ is free for p in φ
if φ = ¬φ′ then ψ is free for p in φ iff it is in φ′
if φ = φ′ → φ′′then ψ is free for p in φ iff it is in φ′ and φ′′
if φ = Kaφ
′ then ψ is free for p in φ iff it is in φ′
if φ = [φ′]φ′′ then ψ is free for p in φ iff it is in φ′ and φ′′
and p ∈ fr(φ′) implies ψ ∈ Lsopl
if φ = ∀qφ′ then ψ is free for p in φ iff q /∈ fr(ψ)
and ψ is free for p in φ′
Finally, we introduce substitutions for free atoms.
Definition 4 (Substitution). If ψ is free for p in φ,
then we inductively define the substitution φ[p/ψ] as follows:
q[p/ψ] =
{
q for q different from p
ψ otherwise
(¬φ)[p/ψ] = ¬(φ[p/ψ])
(φ→ φ′)[p/ψ] = (φ[p/ψ])→ (φ′[p/ψ])
(Kaφ)[p/ψ] = Ka(φ[p/ψ])
([φ]φ′)[p/ψ] = [φ[p/ψ]](φ′[p/ψ])
(∀rφ)[p/ψ] = ∀r(φ[p/ψ]), with p different from r
Notice that we make use of square brackets [, ] for both
substitutions and announcements operators, as both usages
are standard. The context will disambiguate.
The restriction on substitution can be deemed quite strong,
as we allow only for the substitution of quantified boolean
formulas in announcements. Intuitively, this is necessary be-
cause, while [p]p is valid, substitution [q∧¬Kaq](q∧¬Kaq) is
not. Nonetheless, we will see that, also with such restriction,
all results mentioned in the introduction are provable.
2.2 Semantics
To interpret SOPAL formulas we introduce multi-modal
Kripke frames and models.
Definition 5 (Frame). A Kripke frame is a tuple F =
〈W,D,R〉 where
− W is a set of possible worlds;
− D is the domain of propositions, i.e., a subset of 2W ;
− for every agent a ∈ Ag, Ra ⊆ 2W×W is an equivalence
relation on W .
As standard in epistemic logic [6], for every agent a ∈ Ag,
Ra is the indistinguishability relation between worlds in W .
In addition, Def. 5 includes a set D ⊆ 2W of “admissi-
ble” propositions for the interpretation of atoms and quan-
tifiers. For technical reasons, in Section 5 we will also con-
sider frames whose accessibility relations are not necessarily
equivalences. In the following, for each agent a ∈ Ag and
w ∈W , we set Ra(w) = {w′ | Ra(w,w′)}.
To assign a meaning to SOPAL formulas we introduce
assignments as functions V : AP → D. Given a set U ∈ D,
the assignment V pU assigns U to p and coincides with V on
all other atoms. Notice that atoms can only be assigned
propositions in D ⊆ 2W . A (Kripke) model is then defined
as a pair M = 〈F , V 〉.
In the rest of the paper we analyse particular classes of
Kripke frames and models, which feature pre-eminently in
the literature [10, 16]. To introduce them, we define an
operator [a] : 2W → 2W for every a ∈ Ag, such that [a](U) =
{w ∈W | Ra(w) ⊆ U}.
Definition 6. A Kripke frame F is
boolean iff D is a boolean algebra, i.e., it is closed under
intersection, union and complementation
epistemic iff D is a boolean algebra with operators [a], for
every a ∈ Ag
full iff D = 2W
A Kripke model M = 〈F , V 〉 is boolean (resp. epistemic,
full) whenever the underlying frame F is.
Hereafter we consider classes Kall of all Kripke frames,
Kbl of all boolean frames, Kel of all epistemic frames, and
Kfl of all full frames.
Definition 7 (Satisfaction). We define whether
model M = 〈F , V 〉 satisfies formula ϕ at world w,
or (M, w) |= ϕ, as follows (clauses for propositional
connectives are omitted as straightforward):
(M, w) |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
(M, w) |= Kaψ iff for all w′ ∈ Ra(w), (M, w′) |= ψ
(M, w) |= [ψ]ψ′ iff (M, w) |= ψ implies (M|ψ, w) |= ψ′
(M, w) |= ∀pψ iff for all U ∈ D, (MpU , w) |= ψ
where MpU = 〈F , V pU 〉, and the restriction M|ψ =
〈W|ψ, D|ψ,
R|ψ, V|ψ〉 of model M according to ψ is defined as: (i)
W|ψ = {v ∈W | (M, v) |= ψ}; (ii) D|ψ = {U|ψ = U ∩W|ψ |
U ∈ D}; (iii) R|ψ,a = Ra ∩W 2|ψ; (iv) V|ψ(p) = V (p) ∩W|ψ
for every p ∈ AP .
Given formula φ ∈ Lsopal, [[φ]]M = {w ∈ W | (M, w) |=
φ} is the satisfaction set in modelM. We omit the subscript
M whenever clear from the context. We then prove the
following useful lemma on satisfaction sets.
Lemma 1. For every formula φ ∈ Lx, for x = pl (resp. el,
pal, sopal), and for M = 〈F , V 〉 with F ∈ Ky, for y = bl
(resp. el, el, fl), we have that [[φ]] ∈ D.
Proof. The case for x = pl and y = bl follows from
equalities [[¬ψ]] = \[[ψ]], [[ψ ∧ ψ′]] = [[ψ]] ∩ [[ψ′]], [[ψ ∨ ψ′]] =
[[ψ]] ∪ [[ψ′]] and the fact that D is a boolean algebra.
For x = el and y = el, notice that [[Kaψ]] = [a]([[ψ]]) and
D is a boolean algebra with operators [a].
The case of x = pal and y = el follows since PAL is as
expressive as Epistemic Logic [18].
The case for x = sopal and y = fl is trivial.
By Lemma 1 we can prove the following result, which
guarantees that Def. 7 is well-defined in the sense that the
restriction M|φ belongs to the same class as model M.
Lemma 2. If a modelM is boolean (resp. epistemic, full),
then the model restrictionM|φ for φ ∈ Lsopal is also boolean
(resp. epistemic, full).
Proof. The proof for full frames is immediate, as for all
U ⊆W|φ, U ⊆W and then U ∈ D. Hence, U|φ = U ∈ D|φ.
The proof for boolean frames follows from the equalities
below, for ? ∈ {∩,∪}:
U|φ ? U
′
|φ = (U ? U
′)|φ \(U|φ) = (\U)|φ
As for epistemic frames, we remark that
[a](U|φ) = ([a](\[[φ]] ∪ U))|φ
(here [a] denotes two different operations, the former onM|φ
and the latter on M.) Indeed, w ∈ [a](U|φ) iff R|φ,a(w) ⊆
U|φ. Since, R|φ,a(w) = Ra(w) ∩ W 2|φ, this is the case iff
w ∈ [[φ]] and for every w′ ∈ Ra(w), w′ ∈ [[φ]] implies w′ ∈ U ,
iff w ∈ [[φ]] and Ra(w) ⊆ (\[[φ]] ∪ U), iff w ∈ ([a](\[[φ]] ∪
U))φ. Finally, notice that [a](\[[φ]] ∪ U) ∈ D, as [[φ]] ∈ D for
every φ ∈ Lel by Lemma 1 and D is a boolean algebra with
operators. Hence, [a](U|φ) = ([a](\[[φ]] ∪ U))φ ∈ D|φ.
We introduce standard notions of truth and validity to be
used hereafter. A formula φ is true at w, or (F , w) |= φ,
iff (〈F , V 〉, w) |= φ for every assignment V ; φ is valid in a
frame F , or F |= φ, iff (F , w) |= φ for every world w in F ; φ
is valid in a class K of frames, or K |= φ, iff F |= φ for every
F ∈ K.
Example 2. To illustrate the semantics of SOPAL, we
consider the following instance of (3) for Moore’s formula
p ∧ ¬Kap:
(p ∧ ¬Kap)→ ∀q[Kaq](p ∧ ¬Kap) (4)
and show that (4) is a validity in all frames.
Suppose that (M, w) |= p ∧ ¬Kap. Then, for some w′ ∈
Ra(w) different from w, (M, w′) 6|= p. Also, if (MqU , w) 6|=
[Kaq](p∧¬Kap) for some reinterpretationMqU , then we have
((MqU )|Kaq, w) 6|= p∧¬Kap, that is, (MqU , w) |= Kaq but w′
must not appear in (MqU )|Kaq, i.e., (MqU , w′) 6|= Kaq. But
then, (MqU , w) 6|= Kaq either. A contradiction.
Thus, even though Moore’s formulas are not preserved
under arbitrary announcements, they are indeed preserved
by arbitrary epistemic announcements as in (4). 
Example 3. Next, we elaborate on the example of [24,
Section 4.3], and consider a simple card game with three
players in Ag = {1, 2, 3}. The cards are identified by their
colour: red (r), white (w), and blue (b). We consider atoms
ri, wi, bi, for i ∈ Ag, in AP , where intuitively w1 denotes
that player 1 holds the white card. Also, all players know
the cards of the game, and that each player can see his own
card, but not that of the other players. The situation where
each player is dealt a card can be modeled by the full model
M in Fig. 1. The state rwb in M denotes that player 1
holds red, 2 holds white, and 3 holds blue. We then have
for instance
(M, rwb) |= r1 ∧K1r1 ∧ ¬K2r1 ∧K1¬K2r1
rwb rbw
wbr
bwrbrw
wrb
1
2
3
1
1
2
2 33
rwb rbw1
Figure 1: The full modelsM andM′ (reflexive edges
are omitted for simplicity)
i.e., player 1 holds red, she knows it, but 2 does not, and
finally, 1 knows that 2 does not know that 1 holds red.
In general, for every state s in M,
(M, s) |= ∃p
p ∧Kip ∧∧
j 6=i
¬Kjp ∧Ki
∧
j 6=i
¬Kjp

i.e., every player i knows something that the other players
do not know (and she knows that they do not), namely the
value of the card that i possesses.
Now suppose player 1 announces publicly the card she has.
Such an announcement in state rwb leads to the updated
model M′ in Fig. 1. Indeed, for qi ∈ {ri, wi, bi} we have
(M, s) |= qi → ∃p〈Kip〉
∧
j 6=i
Kjqi

that is, there is some proposition (namely, the value U =
Ri(s) of player i’s card) that player i can truthfully an-
nounce, so that any other player knows the value of i’s card.
On the other hand, the mere announcement that player
i knows something is not sufficient to derive the same con-
clusion, as for every state s ∈ W , (M, s) |= ∃pKip, and
therefore M|∃pKip =M. Hence,
(M, s) 6|= qi → 〈∃pKip〉
∧
j 6=i
Kjqi

Furthermore, the (false) announcement that player i knows
everything trivially implies that the other players know her
card:
(M, s) |= qi → [∀pKip]
∧
j 6=i
Kjqi

Indeed, (M, s) 6|= ∀pKip. Then, (M, s) |= [∀pKip](∧j 6=iKjqi).
However, it is not the case that every truthful announcement
pertaining to player i’s knowledge entails that the other
players know her card:
(M, s) 6|= qi → ∀p[Kip]
∧
j 6=i
Kjqi

as for proposition U = W , (MpU , s′) |= Kip for every s′ ∈W .
But ((MpU )|Kip, s) 6|=
∧
j 6=iKjqi, since (MpU )|Kip =MpU .
By comparing the formulas above, we clearly see that
quantifying inside or outside (epistemic) announcements al-
lows us to express subtle differences in SOPAL. 
3. COMPARISONWITH APAL
In this section we compare SOPAL with APAL, whose
original motivation also included the ability to express arbi-
trary announcements in PAL. The main result of this section
is that SOPAL is capable of capturing APAL at the frame
level, while the two logics are incomparable at the model
level. But first we state some auxiliary lemmas, that will
be routinely applied throughout the paper, which illustrate
some features of quantification in SOPAL.
Lemma 3. Let q and ψ be free for p in φ.
1. In Kall, (MpV (q), w) |= φ iff (M, w) |= φ[p/q]
2. For x = bl (resp. el, fl) and y = pl (resp. el, sopal), in Kx,
(Mp
[[ψ]]
, w) |= φ iff (M, w) |= φ[p/ψ], for any ψ ∈ Ly
3.If p ∈ fr(φ) implies ψ ∈ Lsopl, then (Mp[[ψ]])|φ = (M|φ[p/ψ])
p
[[ψ]]
4. If V (fr(φ)) = V ′(fr(φ)) then (M, w) |= φ iff (M′, w) |= φ
5. If V (fr(ψ)) = V ′(fr(ψ)) then Mψ =M′ψ
According to Lemma 3.1-2, the syntactic notion of substi-
tution φ[p/ψ] corresponds to the semantic concept of rein-
terpretation Mp[[ψ]]; while Lemma 3.3 specifies the interac-
tion between substitution, reinterpretation and model re-
striction, namely the restriction (Mp[[ψ]])|φ of a reinterpreted
model is equal to the reinterpretation (M|φ[p/ψ])p[[ψ]] of the
model restricted by the substituted formula φ[p/ψ], pro-
vided that ψ ∈ Lsopl whenever p ∈ fr(φ). Moreover, by
Lemma 3.4-5 models built on the same frame and agreeing
on the interpretation of free atoms, also satisfy the same for-
mulas, and their model restrictions are equal. These results,
which show that quantification in SOPAL is “well-behaved”,
will be extensively used hereafter.
To compare SOPAL and APAL we recall the clause for
interpreting the 2 operator [2]:
(M, w) |= 2ψ iff for all φ ∈ Lel, (M, w) |= [φ]ψ (5)
We now prove that, according to (5), APAL can be cap-
tured within SOPAL in the following sense.
Definition 8. Given a class K of frames, a logic L′ is
• at least as m-expressive as logic L, or L ≤m L′, iff for
any φ ∈ L, for some φ′ ∈ L′, for any model M based
on some frame in K,
(M, w) |= φ iff (M, w) |= φ′
• at least as f-expressive as logic L, or L ≤f L′, iff for
any φ ∈ L, for some φ′ ∈ L′, for any frame F in K,
(F , w) |= φ iff (F , w) |= φ′
Clearly, each relation ≤ is a partial order, and we write
L = L′ iff L ≤ L′ and L′ ≤ L, and L < L′ iff L ≤ L′ and
L 6= L′. Also, L ≤m L′ implies L ≤f L′.
To investigate the relation between SOPAL and APAL,
we start with some preliminary results. First of all, we test
the intuition that the operator 2 can be expressed by quan-
tification and announcements.
Lemma 4. Let M be an epistemic model, then
(M, w) |= ∀p[p]φ implies that (M, w) |= 2φ (6)
w00 w10
w01 w11
b
a a
b
s0
s1
a
Figure 2: The full modelsM andM′ (reflexive edges
are omitted for simplicity)
Proof. Indeed, if (M, w) 6|= [ψ]φ for some ψ ∈ Lel,
then in particular, [[ψ]] ∈ D by Lemma 1 and for U = [[ψ]],
(MpU , w) 6|= [p]φ. That is, (M, w) 6|= ∀p[p]φ.
However, the converse of (6) does not always hold. Con-
sider the full model M in Fig. 2. Formally, we have that
M = 〈W,R,D, V 〉 with W = {w00, w01, w10, w11}; Ra =
{(wij , wi′j′) | i = i′}; Rb = {(wij , wi′j′) | j = j′}; D = 2W ;
and V (q) = {wij | j = 0} for every q ∈ AP . We can
check that, for every ψ ∈ Lel, [[ψ]] is equal to either W ,
or ∅, or {wij | j = 0}, or {wij | j = 1}. As a conse-
quence, for every ψ ∈ Lel, (M, wi0) |= [ψ](Kaq → KbKaq),
that is, (M, wi0) |= 2(Kaq → KbKaq). However, for U =
{w00, w01, w10} we obtain that (MpU , w10) 6|= [p](Kaq →
KbKaq), i.e., (M, w10) 6|= ∀p[p](Kaq → KbKaq).
Actually, Def. (5) for APAL preserves bisimilarity of struc-
tures, while Def. 7 for SOPAL does not. To see this,
consider the full model M′ in Fig. 2. We remark with-
out proof that the pointed models (M, w10) and (M′, s0)
are bisimilar [6], and satisfy the same formulas in PAL,
and consequently, in APAL. However, we noticed that
(M, w10) 6|= ∀p[p](Kaq → KbKaq), while it is easy to check
that (M′, s0) |= ∀p[p](Kaq → KbKaq).
Incidentally, models M and M′ above prove that at the
level of models, SOPAL is no less expressive than APAL.
Theorem 5. In class Kfl of full frames, SOPAL 6≤m
APAL.
Proof. Suppose that SOPAL ≤m APAL. Then, for φ =
∀p[p](Kaq → KbKaq) in SOPAL there exists a correspond-
ing φ′ in APAL. However, (M, w10) 6|= φ implies (M, w10) 6|=
φ′, which implies (M′, s0) 6|= φ′ by bisimulation, which fi-
nally implies (M′, s0) 6|= φ. A contradiction.
We observe that Def. 7 is discussed in [2], but discarded
exactly on the ground that it does not preserve bisimula-
tions. Bisimulation-preserving quantification is analysed in
[11], the resulting logic is proved as expressive as Epistemic
Logic. Here we maintain that in second-order propositional
modal logics a stronger notion of bisimulation is needed,
which takes into account also quantification, as discussed in
[5]. Also, Def. (5) has other issues, in particular, it is not
analytic (more below).
Even though ∀p[p]ψ is not equivalent to 2ψ at the level
of models, the two formulas are provably equivalent at the
level of frames, under a cardinality assumption.
Consider the following translation τ from APAL to
SOPAL:
τ(p) = p
τ(¬ψ) = ¬τ(ψ)
τ(ψ → ψ′) = τ(ψ)→ τ(ψ′)
τ(Kaψ) = Kaτ(ψ)
τ([ψ]ψ′) = [ψ]τ(ψ′)
τ(2ψ′) = ∀p[p]τ(ψ′)
where p does not appear free in ψ′.
We can now prove the following result.
Lemma 6. In the class of epistemic frames where |D| is
enumerable,
|= φ iff |= τ(φ)
Proof. The ⇐ direction follows from (6) above.
As for the ⇒ direction, suppose that for some model M
and state w, (M, w) 6|= τ(φ). Consider now a model M′
s.t. F ′ = F and V ′ coincides with V on all atoms appearing
in φ. Further, for every U ∈ D take qU ∈ AP not appearing
in φ and let V ′(qU ) = U . By Lemma 3.4, (M, w) 6|= τ(φ)
implies (M′, w) 6|= τ(φ) (the assignment V ′(q) for all atoms
not appearing in φ and not assigned to a set U is uninfluen-
tial.)
Hereafter we write N ⊆ M to express that N is a sub-
model of M, i.e., WN ⊆ W ; DN = {U ∩WN | U ∈ D};
RN ,a = Ra∩W 2N ; and VN (p) = V (p)∩WN for every p ∈ AP .
We can now state the following auxiliary result: for every
submodel N ′ of M′ and subformula ψ of φ,
(N ′, w) |= ψ iff (N ′, w) |= τ(ψ) (7)
Finally, by (7) (M′, w) 6|= τ(φ) implies (M′, w) 6|= φ.
As a result, whenever the domain D of propositions is enu-
merable, APAL can be captured within SOPAL at the frame
level, by means of translation τ . Specifically, the arbitrary
announcement operator 2 can be expressed by quantifica-
tion and standard announcements. As a corollary, we have
the following result.
Corollary 7. In the class of epistemic frames where |D|
is enumerable, APAL ≤f SOPAL.
We now show that the converse does not hold in general.
Theorem 8. In class Kfl of full frames, SOPAL 6≤f
APAL.
As an immediate consequence of Corollary 7 and Theo-
rem 8 we obtain the following.
Corollary 9. In class of epistemic frames where |D| is
enumerable, APAL <f SOPAL.
Finally, we remarked above that Def. 7 is discussed in
[2], but dismissed as it does not preserve bisimulations.
On the other hand, the APAL semantics is not analytic
in the sense that Lemma 3.4 fails: models that agree on
the interpretation of free atoms, may differ in the satis-
faction of formulas. Consider again model M in Fig. 2
and ϕ = 2(Kaq → KbKaq). Then, define model M′′
such that for every U ⊆ W , V (pU ) = U for some pU 6=
q. Clearly, V and V ′′ agree on the only free variable q
in ϕ. However, (M, w00) |= ϕ as noticed above, while
(M′′, w00) 6|= ϕ. In particular, for U = {w00, w01, w10},
(M′′, w00) 6|= [pU ](Kaq → KbKaq). Therefore, in APAL the
satisfaction of formulas does not depend on values assigned
to free variables only, but, if the formula contains an op-
erator 2, on all variables in AP . The example above also
entails the following result.
Theorem 10. In class Kfl of full frames, APAL 6≤m
SOPAL.
Proof. If APAL ≤m SOPAL, then for ϕ = 2(Kaq →
KbKaq) in APAL there exists a corresponding ϕ
′ in SOPAL.
However, (M, w00) |= ϕ implies (M, w00) |= ϕ′, which
implies (M′′, w00) |= ϕ′ by Lemma 3.4, which implies
(M′′, w00) |= ϕ. A contradiction.
To summarize the main results proved in this section,
SOPAL and APAL are incomparable at the model level,
while the former is strictly more expressive than the latter
at the frame level.
4. EXPRESSIVITY
In this section we explore expressivity in the various
classes of Kripke frames, starting with the properties of
quantifiers. The main result of this section is that SOPAL is
as expressive as Second-order Propositional Epistemic Logic.
Lemma 11. In SOPAL we have the following validities,
for x ∈ {bl, el, f l} and y ∈ {pl, el, sopal}:
Kall |= ∀pφ→ φ[p/q] for every q ∈ AP (8)
Kx |= ∀pφ→ φ[p/ψ] for every ψ ∈ Ly (9)
where q and ψ are free for p in φ.
For every class K of frames,
K |= ψ → φ implies K |= ψ → ∀pφ (10)
where p does not appear free in ψ.
We remark the essential use of Lemmas 3.2-5 in this proof.
By Lemma 11 we can see that quantifiers in SOPAL sat-
isfy the standard principles of quantification: exemplifica-
tion (8)-(9) and generalisation (10).
It is of utmost interest to study the interactions between
quantification and public announcements in SOPAL. In this
respect, we obtain the following key result.
Lemma 12. The following validities hold in all classes of
frames.
[ψ]∀pφ ↔ ψ → ∀p[ψ]φ (11)
〈ψ〉∃pφ ↔ ψ ∧ ∃p〈ψ〉φ (12)
[ψ] ∃pφ ↔ ψ → ∃p[ψ]φ (13)
〈ψ〉∀pφ ↔ ψ ∧ ∀p〈ψ〉φ (14)
where p does not appear in ψ (w.l.o.g. bound variables can
always be renamed).
Proof. As regards (11) observe that,
(M, w) |= [ψ]∀pφ iff (M, w) |= ψ implies (M|ψ, w) |= ∀pφ
iff (M, w) |= ψ implies for all U ′ ∈ D|ψ,
((M|ψ)pU′ , w) |= φ
Now, if U ∈ D then U ′ = U ∩W|ψ ∈ D|ψ. On the other
hand, if U ′ ∈ D|ψ then for some U ∈ D, U ′ = U ∩W|ψ. In
particular (V|ψ)
p
U′ = (V
p
U )|ψ, as p does not appear free in ψ.
Hence,
(M, w) |= [ψ]∀pφ iff (M, w) |= ψ implies for all U ∈ D,
((MpU )|ψ, w) |= φ
iff (M, w) |= ψ implies (M, w) |= ∀p[ψ]φ
iff (M, w) |= ψ → ∀p[ψ]φ
The other equivalences are proved similarly.
We recall that Second-order Propositional Epistemic
Logic is obtained by removing clause [ψ]ψ from Def. 1. From
Lemma 12 and the standard reduction axioms for PAL [18]
we derive the following expressivity result:
Theorem 13. SOPAL is as expressive as SOPEL.
This result is extremely relevant, as it allows to apply the
model theory and techniques for SOPEL also to SOPAL. As
an example, the bisimulations introduced in [5] for Second-
order Propositional Modal Logic apply to SOPAL as well.
Further consequences of Theorem 13 regard the decidability
of model checking SOPAL and its axiomatisability.
Corollary 14.
• The model checking problem for SOPAL is decidable.
• SOPAL has a sound and complete axiomatisation.
These results directly follow from the PSPACE-
completeness and axiomatisation of SOPEL in [4].
4.1 Knowability
In this section we analyse the notions of preservation and
knowability introduced in Example 1, and present success-
fulness. Such concepts are of interest to understand the epis-
temic capabilities of agents in response to different types of
public announcements.
We start by introducing the positive fragment L+sopal in-
ductively defined as
ψ ::= p | ¬p | ψ ∧ ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | Kaψ | [¬ψ]ψ | ∀pψ
As anticipated in Example 1, preserved formulas keep
their truth under arbitrary announcements. Given a class
K, they are defined semantically as those φ in SOPAL for
which K |= φ→ ∀p[p]φ. We immediately extend the follow-
ing result for APAL.
Lemma 15. Positive formulas are preserved in Kall.
Proof. We show that for every modelM,M′,M′′ with
M′′ ⊆ M′ ⊆ M, s ∈ W ′′, and positive φ, (M′, s) |= φ
implies (M′′, s) |= φ. The inductive cases for φ 6= ∀pψ
follow as in [20]. As for φ = ∀pψ, Consider U ′′ ∈ W ′′
s.t. (M′′pU′′ , s) |= ψ. Clearly, M′′pU′′ ⊆ M′pU′ for U ′ ∈ D′
s.t. U ′′ = U ′ ∩W ′′. Moreover, hypothesis (M′, s) |= ∀pψ
implies (M′pU′ , s) |= ψ, and by induction hypothesis it follows
that (M′′pU′′ , s) |= ψ. Since U ′′ is arbitrary, (M′′, s) |= ∀pψ.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 15, positive for-
mulas are preserved in every class of frames.
In connection with preserved formulas, in Example 1 we
introduced the formulas preserved after arbitrary epistemic
announcements (in a class K) as those formulas φ for which
K |= φ → ∀p[Kap]φ. In Example 2 we remarked that
Moore’s formulas are not preserved under arbitrary an-
nouncements, but they are for epistemic announcements.
Obviously, positive formulas are also preserved epistemi-
cally. So, it would be of interest to characterize exactly
the class of formulas preserved under arbitrary epistemic
announcements, but this is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
Another semantic notion of interest when dealing with
public announcements is that of success. Formally, a formula
φ is successful in class K of frames iff [φ]φ is valid in K.
Lemma 16. Formulas preserved in their own class K of
frames are successful in K.
Finally, we recall that for a given class K of frames, know-
able formulas as those for which, for any agents a ∈ Ag,
K |= φ→ ∃p〈p〉Kaφ [22].
Lemma 17. Positive formulas are knowable in Kall (al-
ways knowable). Formulas preserved (resp. successful) in
their own class K are also knowable in K.
We clearly see that SOPAL allows for a fine-grained anal-
ysis of the epistemic notions of preservation, successfulness,
and knowability.
5. SUCCINCTNESS OF SOPAL
The fact that SOPAL and SOPEL are equally expressive
does not necessarily mean that they are ‘the same’. Indeed,
we now argue that SOPAL is more succinct than SOPEL,
in the sense described below. We will sketch the argument
using techniques from [12], where it was proven that PAL is
exponentionally more succinct than epistemic logic. For the
following we define the length |φ| of a formula φ as standard.
Definition 9. Given two logics L1 and L2 that are
equally expressive on a class K of frames, we say that
L1 is exponentially more succinct than L2 on K, written
L1 expK L2, if the following holds: There are sequences
ϕn∈N = ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · ∈ L1 and ψn∈N = ψ1, ψ2, · · · ∈ L2 and
a polynomial function f such that, for all n ∈ N,
1. |ϕn| ≤ f(n);
2. |ψn| > 2n;
3. ψn is the shortest formula in L2 equivalent to ϕn in
K.
In stating the main result below we also consider the class
C of frames with arbitrary accessibility relations.
Theorem 18.
• SOPAL expC SOPEL, if |Ag| ≥ 2
• SOPAL expKall SOPEL, if |Ag| ≥ 4
We will only argue here for the first item of the theorem.
Consider the following two sequences ϕn∈N and ψn∈N.
ϕ0 = >
ϕn+1 = 〈ϕn〉(Map ∨Mbq)
ψ0 = >
ψn = Ma(ψn−1 ∧ p) ∨Mb(ψn−1 ∧ q)
It is easy to see that |ϕi| ≤ i · 6 and |ψi| ≥ 2i. Using PAL
equivalences, we also have that ϕi and ψi are equivalent,
for all i. So the first two items for succinctness are easily
checked, what remains to establish is, that even when we
allow for quantification, there are no formulas βi ∈ Lsopel
shorter than ψi ∈ Lsopel equivalent to ψi.
For propositional epistemic logic, the technique that [12]
uses for this is that of Formula Size Games. We now extend
such games to deal with quantification.
Definition 10 (Formula Size Game). The rules of
the one-person formula size game (FSG) for Spoiler are
the following. The game is played on a tree, where each
node is labeled with a pair 〈M ◦ N〉 such that M and N
are finite sets of finite pointed models. At each step of the
game, a node is labeled with one of the symbols from the set
Σ = {>,⊥, p,¬,∨,∧,Mi,Ki, ∃p,∀p} and either it is closed
or at most two new nodes are added. Let a node 〈M ◦N〉 be
given. Spoiler can make the following moves at this node:
>-move This can be played only if N = ∅. When Spoiler
plays this move, the node is closed and labeled with >.
atomic-move Spoiler chooses an atom p such that every
pointed model in M satisfies p, and no pointed model
in N does. After this move, this node is closed and
labeled with p.
not-move Spoiler labels the node with symbol ¬ and adds
one new node denoted 〈N◦M〉 as a successor to 〈M◦N〉.
or-move Spoiler labels the node with symbol ∨ and splits M
in two sets M = M1 ∪M2. Two new nodes are added
to the tree as successors to 〈M ◦N〉, i.e., 〈M1 ◦N〉 and
〈M2 ◦N〉.
Ma-move Spoiler labels the node with symbol Ma and for
each pointed model (M, w) ∈ M, he chooses a pointed
model (M, w′) such that wRiw′. All such choices are
collected in M1. A set of models N1 is then constructed
as follows. For each pointed model (N , v) ∈ N add to
N1 all pointed models (N , v′) such that vRiv′. If for
some pointed model (N , v), world v does not have an
Ri-successor, nothing is added to N1 for (N , v). A new
node 〈M1 ◦N1〉 is added as a successor to 〈M ◦N〉.
∃p-move Spoiler labels the node with symbol ∃p, and, for
each (M, w) ∈ M, Spoiler chooses a set U ∈ DM and
replaces (M, w) by (MpU , v). All those choices are col-
lected in M1. A set N1 is then constructed as follows.
For every (N , v) ∈ N and U ′ ∈ DN , add (N pU′ , v) to
N.
The moves for ⊥, and, Ka, and ∀p can be inferred from
this: Spoiler acts on N, instead of M. and-moves and or-
moves are collectively called splitting moves, while Ka and
Ma-moves are called agent moves.
Definition 11. Spoiler wins the FSG starting at 〈M◦N〉
in n moves iff there is a game tree T with root 〈M ◦ N〉
and precisely n nodes such that every leaf of T is closed.
Otherwise, Spoiler loses the game in n moves.
Theorem 19. Spoiler can win the FSG starting at 〈M ◦
N〉 in less than k moves iff there is a SOPEL formula ψ such
that M |= ψ, N |= ¬ψ, |ψ| = n, and n < k.
Proof. We briefly sketch the case for quantifiers, for the
other cases we refer to [12, Theorem 1]. The ‘if’ direction
is by induction on the formula, so suppose ϕ = ∃pψ, with
the claim proven for ψ with |ψ| = n − 1. That is, suppose
that ϕ has size n < k and that M |= ∃pψ while N |= ¬∃pψ.
Spoiler plays the ∃p-move: since M |= ∃pψ, for every model
(M, w) ∈ M, Spoiler can choose some U ∈ DM such that
(MpU , w) |= ψ. Collecting all pointed models thus obtained
in M1, we have M1 |= ψ. Since N |= ¬∃pψ, if we put all
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Figure 3: The game tree from Example 4.
models (N , v) in a set N1, we have N1 |= ¬ψ. We know that
Spoiler can win the sub-game starting in 〈M1 ◦N1〉 in n− 1
moves, which in turn ensures he wins the game starting in
〈M ◦N〉 in n moves.
For the ‘only-if’ direction, if Spoiler has won the FSG
starting at 〈M ◦ N〉 (in n < k moves) then the resulting
closed game tree is a parse tree of a formula ϕ of length n
such that M |= ϕ and N |= ¬ϕ. To see this, we label the
nodes of the tree with formulae, starting with the leaves. In
particular, if a node has a label ∃p and its successor is labeled
with ψ, then the current node is labeled with ∃pψ. One can
verify that for each node 〈A ◦ B〉, the formula labelling the
node is true in A, and false in B. Hence, the game tree is a
parse tree for the formula labelling the root.
Example 4. Consider Figure 3. This is a game tree for
pair pair 〈M,N〉 with M = {(M, w)} and N = {(N , w)}, de-
picted, resp. left and right of the root of the tree. Designated
points of models are black dots, non-designated points are
open dots. Leaves are closed nodes and are depicted with
thick perimeters. We further assume that in M and N all
atoms are true in all worlds, and there is only one agent, a.
Notice that the two initial models are bisimilar, and hence
have the same epistemic theory. This implies that the FSG
starting in 〈M ◦ N〉 can only be won if an ∃p or ∀p move is
played. Note that the game displayed ‘corresponds’ to the
formula ∃p(Ma¬p ∧ p). 
In light of Theorem 19, if we can, for every n ∈ N, find
classes Mn and Nn of pointed models such that the following
two items hold (details omitted), then we have shown that
also item 3 of Definition 9 holds for the three step proof that
settles that SOPAL expC SOPEL.
1. Mn |= ψn and Nn |= ¬ψn;
2. it takes Spoiler at least 2n moves to win the FSG start-
ing in 〈Mn ◦Nn〉.
We conclude this exercise in succinctness with two re-
marks. Firstly, we think that the notion of FSG can be
extended to be played on frames. Secondly, although our
argument goes through for structures whose accessibility re-
lations are equivalences, the exact formalisation of the argu-
ment is more cumbersome, and can, we think, not be done
on equivalence frames.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced Second-order Propositional
Announcement Logic: a logic to reason about arbitrary an-
nouncements in multi-agent contexts. We presented the
language of SOPAL, which extends Public Announcement
Logic by means of propositional quantification, and endowed
it with a semantics in terms of multi-agent Kripke frames
and models. We illustrated the expressivity of SOPAL by
analysing relevant notions in knowledge reasoning and repre-
sentation, such as preservation under arbitrary (epistemic)
announcements, knowability, and successfulness. Further,
we compared SOPAL with APAL by providing two notions
of order between logics. Specifically, we proved that, while
SOPAL and APAL are uncomparable at the model level,
the former is strictly more expressive than the latter at the
frame level. Moreover, we analysed the set of validities in
SOPAL and provided reduction equivalences that allow to
prove that SOPAL is as expressive as Second-order Propo-
sitional Epistemic Logic. As a consequence, SOPAL has a
decidable model checking problem and a complete axioma-
tisation. Announcements make a difference nonetheless. In-
deed, SOPAL is exponentially more succinct than SOPEL.
We conclude that SOPAL is a succinct, rich logic, strictly
more expressive than previous proposals in the area, but
with nice computational properties still.
Related Literature. This paper draws from two dif-
ferent traditions in knowledge reasoning and representa-
tion: Second-order Propositional Modal Logic [8, 10] on
one hand, and Dynamic Epistemic Logic [23] and Public
Announcement Logic [18, 13] on the other. Both lines of
research are well-established, with a rich literature. For
reasons of space we only discuss the closest contributions.
Second-order Propositional Epistemic Logic has been intro-
duced in [4], where it is called Epistemic Quantified Boolean
Logic. The designation ‘second-order’ used here is standard
in the literature [19, 15], referring to features of propositional
quantification. In [5] bisimulations for SOPEL are put for-
ward. In the line of Public Announcement Logic, APAL
has been presented in [2, 3], with the aim of capturing ar-
bitrary announcements. We share the same motivation, but
the formal analysis through propositional quantification is
novel. Quantification (on bisimilar models) has been anal-
ysed in [11]. However, the resulting logic is as expressive as
Epistemic Logic, and therefore strictly weaker than SOPAL.
In future work we plan to develop further the analysis of
SOPAL in multi-agent contexts. In this direction it is of
interest to study agents performing announcements: which
announcements can an agent perform based on her knowl-
edge? How do such announcements modify the epistemic
state of other agents (including knowability and preserva-
tion)? How is the proposed framework to be modified to ac-
commodate private communication? In this direction contri-
butions such as Group Announcement Logic [1] are certainly
relevant. More technically, SOPAL calls for the development
of model-theoretic techniques, such as decision methods for
satisfiability, in line with the well-known model theory of
modal logic [6, 7].
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